Abstract. We construct cryptographic trilinear maps that involve simple, non-ordinary abelian varieties over finite fields. In addition to the discrete logarithm problems on the abelian varieties, the cryptographic strength of the trilinear maps is based on a discrete logarithm problem on the quotient of certain modules defined through the Néron-Severi groups. The discrete logarithm problem is reducible to constructing an explicit description of the algebra generated by two non-commuting endomorphisms, where the explicit description consists of a linear basis with the two endomorphisms expressed in the basis, and the multiplication table on the basis. It is also reducible to constructing an effective Z-basis for the endomorphism ring of a simple non-ordinary abelian variety. Both problems appear to be challenging in general and require further investigation.
Introduction
Cryptographic applications of multilinear maps were first proposed in the work of Boneh and Silverberg [1] . However the existence of cryptographically interesting n-linear maps for n > 2 remains an open problem. The problem has attracted much attention more recently as multilinear maps and their variations have become a useful tool for indistinguishability obfuscation. Very recently Lin and Tessaro [2] showed that trilinear maps are sufficient for the purpose of achieving indistinguishability obfuscation (see [2] for references to related works along several lines of investigation).
In this paper we study cryptographic trilinear maps involving abelian varieties over finite fields. At the AIM workshop on cryptographic multilinear maps (2017) Chinburg suggested that the following map frométale cohomology may serve as the basis of constructing a cryptographically interesting trilinear map:
3) ∼ = µ ℓ where A is an abelian surface over a finite field F and the prime ℓ = char(F). This trilinear map is the starting point of our construction.
Suppose A is a principally polarized abelian variety over a finite field F. LetÂ denote the dual abelian variety. Consider A as a variety overF, the algebraic closure of F. Note that in the map just described we no longer need to assume that A is of dimension 2.
To construct a cryptographically interesting map, we need to work with the Néron-Severi group more carefully. We assume that A is a simple, non-ordinary and principally polarized abelian variety.
Suppose L is an invertible sheaf associated to a Cartier divisor D. Let ϕ D also denote ϕ L . Fix a divisor Θ such that ϕ Θ is a principal polarization. Then L → λ D = ϕ 
Replacing f by a factor of f if necessary we assume that f (λ) = 0 mod ℓ but f 1 (λ) = 0 mod ℓ. Choose a random γ ∈ A[ℓ] so that (f 1 (λ))(γ) = 0, and let 
It also follows that U/ℓU is of dimension 2.
Let E be the submodule of EndA containing all λ D where D is a divisor. Let U be the Z-submodule of End(A) generated by λ D 1 , λ D 2 , and the elements of ℓE. Let U 1 be the Zsubmodule of End(A) generated by 1 and the elements of U .
If
we have e D ′ ℓ (α, β) = ζ a . Let G 1 and G 2 be respectively the cyclic groups generated by α and β, and G 3 = U 1 /U with 1 + U as the generator, we consider the trilinear map
Following the cryptographic literature, we write [a] i for an encoding of a ∈ Z/ℓZ in G i for i = 1, 2, 3. For a ∈ Z/ℓZ, [a] 1 is the point aα and [a] 2 is the point aβ. In particular the encoding of a ∈ Z/ℓZ in G i is deterministic for i = 1, 2. In contrast the encoding in G 3 is probabilistic: for a ∈ Z/ℓZ, [a] 3 is λ D , given in the form of a program P D , where D is a divisor such that λ D ∈ a + U . The length of description of P D is polynomially bounded in the length of the description of D, and D is constructed to be linearly equivalent to aΘ + xD 1 + yD 2 + ℓD 3 for some randomly chosen x, y, D 3 where x, y ∈ {0, . . . , ℓ − 1} and D 3 is a divisor (see § 2.3 for details).
Given [x] 1 = xα, [y] 2 = yβ and [z] 3 = λ such that λ ∈ z + U , the trilinear map can be computed as e Θ ℓ (xα, λ(yβ)) = ζ xyz where ζ = e Θ ℓ (α, β). Suppose the Riemann-Roch space defined by a divisor is efficiently constructible, and the pairing e Θ ℓ is efficiently computable. We will show in § 2 that under these assumptions the trilinear map is efficiently computable.
The cryptographic strength of the trilinear map is linked to the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem in the groups involved. The one group that needs special attention is G 3 = U 1 /U . In the discrete logarithm problem for G 3 = U 1 /U , given λ ∈ U 1 we are to determine a such that λ ∈ a + U .
In the cryptographic setting we assume that polynomially many instantiations of [1] 3 are known. From these encodings of 1 polynomially many divisors λ ∈ U can be obtained. Note that for i = 1, 2, 3 and a, b ∈ Z/ℓZ, a [b] i is an encoding of ab in G i .
To investigate the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem on G 3 = U 1 /U , it will be useful to consider the following more general formulation of a discrete logarithm problem concerning the Néron-Severi group NS(A).
Fix a principal polarization ϕ Θ determined by an ample divisor Θ with χ(Θ) = 1. Let ι : NS(A) → End(A) be the injective map determined by ϕ Θ under which the class of an invertible sheaf L(D) associated to a Cartier divisor D is mapped to
We use || || to denote the bit-length in specifying a number or an object, whereas | | denote the absolute value of a real number or the cardinality of a set. Thus ||A|| is the bit-length of the description of A, including the addition morphism m A . We assume that m A is effectively specified in the sense that given a point a, b ∈ A(F), m A (a, b) can be computed from the description of m A in time polynomially bounded in ||a|| and ||b||. We assume that ||A|| and ||Θ|| are polynomially bounded in log |F| when g = dim A is fixed.
Suppose M is a submodule of E such that 1 ∈ M . Let M 1 be the submodule generated by 1 and the elements of M . An element λ ∈ M 1 is presented as a program that on input a point α of A computes λ(α) in time polynomially bounded in ||λ|| and ||α||. We assume that polynomially many λ ∈ M can be randomly sampled where ||λ|| is polynomially bounded in ||A|| (hence in log |F| when g is fixed).
The discrete logarithm problem on (
In § 3 we consider various attacks on the discrete logarithm problem. We show that if M 1 = Z ⊕ M , then the discrete logarithm problem can be effectively solved. This is why in our construction the module U contains ℓE, so at prime
We show that, if M/ℓM is generated by mutually commuting elements, then the discrete logarithm problem can be effectively solved. This is why we construct λ D 1 and λ D 2 in U where λ D 1 and λ D 2 do not commute, and U/ℓU is of dimension 2.
We show that the discrete logarithm problem can be effectively solved if M is contained in the center of the endomorphism algebra End 0 (A) = End(A) ⊗ Q. The center of End 0 A is isomorphic to a CM field Q(π), where π is a Weil number associated the Frobenius endomorphism. We show that the injective map of E into Q(π) is efficiently computable, and with the injective map the discrete logarithm problem is reduced to straight-forward linear algebra.
The running times of these attacks are polynomial under reasonable heuristic assumptions, most notably that the bit-length of the characteristic polynomial for an endomorphism λ is likely polynomially bounded in ||λ||.
Our analysis shows that when M/ℓM can be generated by commuting elements or when M is contained in the center of End 0 A, the discrete logarithm problem is tractable because we can work with a commutative subalgebra which can be explicitly described. Therefore we choose A to be non-ordinary, so that End 0 (A) is a non-commutative division algebra. Moreover E, the image of N S(A) in EndA, should not be contained in the center of End 0 (A).
In summary there are two important features about the group
Non-commutativity of algebra structure: U 1 is not contained in the center of End 0 A and U/ℓU can be generated by two elements in EndA that do not commute. Our construction leads to two interesting problems. If either problem can be solved efficiently for a simple non-ordinary abelian variety A then trilinear maps constructed from A are not secure.
The first problem is, given λ, µ ∈ E such that λµ = µλ, to construct an explicit description of the algebra Q[λ, µ], by which we mean a basis for Q[λ, µ] as a vector space over Q with λ and µ expressed in the basis, and the multiplication table on the basis.
We say that an endomorphism λ ∈ EndA is effectively specified if for α ∈ A(F), λ(α) can be computed in time polynomial in ||α|| from the description of λ.
A basis µ 1 , ..., µ m for a submodule M of EndA is effective if µ i is effectively specified for i = 1, . . . , m, moreover for every
The second problem is to construct an effective Z-basis for any submodule M ′ of EndA containing M 1 , in particular M ′ can be E or EndA. It is an interesting question whether an effective basis for E or EndA exists and can be efficiently constructed.
These two problems have not been investigated in depth from an algorithmic perspective and appear to be quite challenging in general.
Fix as before a principal polarization ϕ Θ and a corresponding injection ι from NS(A) to EndA. The map ι naturally extends to an injection NS 0 (A) → End 0 A where NS 0 (A) = NS(A) ⊗ Q and End 0 A = EndA ⊗ Q. Through this map NS 0 (A) is identified with the subspace S of End 0 A whose elements are fixed by the Rosati involution defined by ϕ Θ . As before let
Let D = End 0 A, a division algebra. Let K be the center of D, and let K 0 be the subfield of K consisting of elements fixed by the Rosati involution. Let
Abelian varieties can be classified into four types according to these numerical invariants ( [7] p.202). Non-ordinary abelian varieties are of Type II, III for IV, where d ≥ 2.
If A is not Type III, then η ≥ 1/2, and dim Q S = ηd 2 e ≥ 2e ≥ 2e 0 . In this case the image of a random element of NS(A) in S is most likely not in the center K 0 . Consequently when choosing D 1 and D 2 to form U , it is very likely λ D 1 and λ D 2 are not in K.
When A is Type III, η = 1/4, d = 2, and e = e 0 . In this case dim Q S = e = e 0 , so S ⊂ K. Therefore Type III abelian varieties are not adequate for our construction.
What can be efficiently computed
As before divisor will mean Cartier divisor, and since we are dealing with abelian varieties, we also think of them as Weil divisors.
For
, which we also denote as L(D).
As a Weil divisor, a divisor D can be presented as a finite sum of prime divisors n i=1 a i v i where a i ∈ Z and v i is a prime of codimension 1. The length of D, written ||D||, is n i=1 (||a i || + ||v i ||) where ||a|| denotes the bit length of a for a ∈ Z, and ||v i || is the length of the polynomials that define v i .
For α ∈ A(F), the bit length of α, denoted ||α||, is proportional to n log |F ′ | where F ′ is the finite extension of F over which α is defined and n the dimension of the ambient space in which the point is described. We can consider n a constant if the dimension of A is fixed.
We assume that a basis of L(D) can be computed in time polynomial in ||D|| and the dimension of L(D). This is a reasonable assumption when dimension of A is fixed.
Assuming that the pairing e Θ ℓ can be efficiently computed (which is the case for example when A is the Jacobian of a curve), then it will follow that the trilinear map described in the previous section can be computed efficiently.
, and since ϕ D is an isomorphism, it follows from Proposition 9.1 of [5] that D is ample. Since ϕ D is an isomorphism, deg ϕ D = 1, and it follows from Theorem 13.3 [5] From Θ b we can determine b as follows. Sample a random finite set S ⊂ Θ. Then b + β ∈ Θ b for all β ∈ S. Solve for x ∈ A such that x + β ∈ Θ b for all β ∈ S. This amounts to solving a polynomial system. Note that x + β ∈ Θ b implies x ∈ Θ b−β . Hence x ∈ ∩ β∈S Θ b−β . When S is large enough the intersection is likely of dimension zero, hence the polynomial system describing x is likely of dimension zero, and can be solved efficiently when the number of variables is bounded. One of the solutions for x is b, and the correct x can be tested by randomly choosing α ∈ Θ and check if α + x ∈ Θ b .
We remark that when A is the Jacobian variety of a curve C, the problem can be solved even more efficiently, by reducing to constructing functions in the Riemann-Roch space of some divisor on C.
We assume that Θ has length polynomially bounded. A divisor D that is constructed in polynomial time also has length of description ||D|| polynomially bounded. It follows from Lemma 2.2 that λ D is effectively specified. Assuming e Θ ℓ is efficiently computable, then the trilinear map e Θ ℓ (u, λ D (v)) can be computed in expected time polynomially bounded in ||u||, ||v|| and ||D||.
2.2.
Computing the characteristic polynomial of an endomorphism. Suppose λ ∈ End(A) is presented as a program that on input a point α of A computes λ(α) in time polynomially bounded in ||λ|| and ||α||. Let f ∈ Z[x] be the characteristic polynomial of λ. Then f is of degree 2g, where g = dim A. To determine f it is sufficient by Chinese Remainder Theorem to determine f mod ℓ ′ for sufficiently many small primes ℓ ′ with product greater than the maximum absolute value of the coefficients of f . So after obtaining f mod ℓ ′ for many ℓ ′ , we have a candidate polynomial f for the characteristic polynomial of λ. We can check if f (λ) = 0 by applying f (λ) at a randomly chosen point and see if we get the zero point.
To determine f mod ℓ ′ we first determine λ mod ℓ ′ as a map on the 2g-dimensional linear by constructing a basis e 1 , . . . , e 2g for A[ℓ ′ ] and explicitly determining λ(e i ) in terms of the basis. This takes expected time polynomial in (ℓ ′ ) 2g and ||λ||. Then the characteristic polynomial of λ mod ℓ ′ can be computed, hence f mod ℓ ′ .
Therefore we have the following Lemma 2.3.
(1) For prime ℓ ′ not equal to the characteristic of F, the map λ mod ℓ ′ can be explicitly described in terms of a basis of A[ℓ ′ ] in expected time polynomial in (ℓ ′ ) g and ||λ||. (2) The characteristic polynomial f of λ can be constructed in expected time polynomial in ||λ|| and ||f ||.
Recall that in forming D 1 we need to compute the characteristic polynomial of λ D for randomly chosen divisor D. By Lemma 2.2 λ D is effectively specified. We make the heuristic assumption that for random D it is likely that the characteristic polynomial f D has length polynomially bounded in ||D||, in which case f D can be constructed in expected time polynomial in ||D||.
2.3.
Constructing a random representative of a divisor class. Suppose D is an effective divisor. Since A is simple, if D is not ample then ϕ D = 0, so λ D = 0. This can be tested by choosing a random a ∈ A(F) and check if λ D (a) = 0. Now suppose D is an effective ample divisor, and m ∈ Z >0 , we discuss how we can construct a random looking D ′ ∼ mD such that ||D ′ || is polynomial in ||mD|| = O(log |m|||D||).
Since D is effective, L(D) = {0}. Since D is ample, by Theorem 13.3 [5] it follows that
Choose small constant s, t greater than 1, so that m = sm 1 + t for m 1 ∈ Z ≥0 . Choose a random f 1 ∈ L(sD) and a random f 2 ∈ L(tD). Let E 1 = (f ) + sD and E 2 = (f 2 ) + tD. Then mD ∼ m 1 E 1 + E 2 and ||m 1 E 1 + E 2 || is polynomially bounded in ||mD||.
In our construction if a divisor D is chosen in the form D = aΘ+bD 1 +cD 2 +ℓD ′ , we construct a random looking divisor D ′′ linearly equivalent to D to encode the class of λ D + U = a + U .
we can apply the above procedure to aΘ, bD 1 , cD 2 and ℓD ′ respectively to construct
If D is given in the form D = i a i v i where v i is a prime divisor, we may apply the above procedure to each v i that is ample to construct some We have seen by virtue of Lemma 2.2 that the map NS(A)/ℓNS(A) → E/ℓE is efficiently computable. An interesting question is whether the inverse is efficient to compute as well. That is, given µ ∈ E, can we construct efficiently a divisor D such that λ D = µ mod ℓ? In light of the discussion in the next subsection, an affirmative answer would reduce the discrete logarithm problem that concerns us to intersection product. The answer is in the affirmative when EndA is commutative, and this will follow from Lemma 3.1. However the situation in the non-commutative case is far from being clear.
Linear algebra on NS(A)
reduces to intersection product. The reason why the discrete logarithm problem involving NS(A) is specified in terms of elements in E is because linear algebra in NS(A) and NS(A)/ℓNS(A) can be reduced to intersection product of divisors. More specifically to determine a linear relation in NS(A)/ℓNS(A) between a divisor D and a finite set of divisors D 1 , ..., D n , we want to solve for x i such that D is algebraically equivalent to i x i D i modulo ℓ. Let g = dim A. Observe that for a divisor H, the algebraic equivalence
Therefore by computing the (n + 1) intersection products a = D · H g−1 and b i = D i · H g−1 , for i = 1, . . . , n, we get a linear relation a = i b i x i mod ℓ. With sufficiently many linear relations we can determine x i . Therefore if the discrete logarithm problem is specified in terms of divisors then the problem can be reduced to computing intersection products. If g = dim A is fixed, then intersection products on A can in principle be reduced to counting solutions of polynomial systems in bounded number of variables.
The discrete logarithm problem involving N S(A)
We discuss various attacks on the underlying discrete logarithm problem concerning the Néron-Severi group. Let us recall the general set-up of this problem.
Let A be a principally polarized abelian variety defined over a finite field F q . Fix a principal polarization ϕ Θ determined by an ample divisor Θ with χ(Θ) = 1, and consider the injection ι of NS(A) to End(A) determined by ϕ Θ , such that the class of an invertible sheaf L(D), where D is a divisor, is mapped to
Suppose M is a submodule of E such that 1 ∈ M . Let M 1 be the submodule generated by 1 and the elements of M . We do not assume that M is explicitly given, however polynomially many elements of M can be randomly sampled.
, we want to determine a mod ℓ such that λ = a+ µ with a ∈ Z and µ ∈ M . To determine a it is sufficient to determine a mod ℓ ′ for sufficiently many small primes ℓ ′ .
We may assume that we have sampled enough elements of M that they generate M/ℓ ′ M as a vector space over F ℓ ′ . By Lemma 2.3 we can determine for each sampled element µ the action of µ on a basis of A[ℓ ′ ] in time polynomial in ℓ ′ g . Therefore we can construct a F ℓ ′ -basis µ 1 , ...,
Once the equality is verified we know that a = a 0 mod ℓ ′ . The amount of time required is polynomial in ℓ ′ g .
In constructing our trilinear map we make sure that for ℓ ′ = ℓ, U/ℓ ′ U = U 1 /ℓ ′ U 1 , in other words, U and U 1 are indistinguishable mod ℓ ′ . This is accomplished by including ℓE in U .
3.2.
The case M/ℓM is of dimension no greater than one. Since deg is a (homogeneous) polynomial function of degree 2g on End 0 A ( [5] Proposition 12.4), it follows that deg(aλ) = a 2g deg λ for λ ∈ End 0 A, moreover if λ, µ ∈ EndA and λ = µ mod ℓ, then deg λ = deg µ mod ℓ. Hence the discrete-log problem in the case M = ℓE is reduced to degree computation. In particular if λ = a mod ℓ then deg λ = a 2g mod ℓ. Determine the characteristic polynomials of λ. From the constant terms of the polynomials we get deg λ. Then a can be determined.
3.2.1. M/ℓM is of dimension 1. In the discrete logarithm problem we have polynomially many samples of elements in M . Pick one λ such that λ = 0 mod ℓ, which can be checked by choosing a random α ∈ A[ℓ] and verify that λ(α) = 0.
Given µ ∈ M 1 we want to find a such that µ = a + bλ mod ℓ where b ∈ Z.
Since a + bλ ∈ Q[λ] ⊂ End 0 A and Q[λ] is a commutative field, every root of the characteristic polynomial of a + bλ is of the form a + bγ where γ is a root of the characteristic polynomial of λ. The characteristic polynomial of a + bλ is f ( 
3.3.
The case M/ℓM is generated by at least two elements. The line of attack described below can be easily generalized, however for simplicity, we illustrate the ideas with the case where M/ℓM is generated by two elements. So from the random samples of elements of M pick two, λ and µ, then it is likely that they generate M/ℓM . Therefore the discrete logarithm problem can be described as follows: given ω ∈ M 1 , to find a such that ω = a + bλ + cµ mod ℓ where b, c ∈ Z.
By an explicit description of the algebra K = Q[λ, µ] we mean a basis over Q as vector space with λ and µ expressed in terms of the basis, and the multiplication table on the basis elements.
If λ and µ commute, then K = Q[λ, µ] is a commutative field of extension degree dividing 2g. Let f (x) and g(x) be respectively the irreducible polynomials of λ and µ. An explicit description of the algebra K can be obtained from f (x) and g(x) as follows. Factor g(x) over Q [λ] . Then we can express the action of a + bλ + cµ on the basis with the help of the multiplication table and from that determine the characteristic polynomial of a + bλ + cµ acting on K, with coefficients being polynomials in a, b, c. This polynomial, if the degree is 2g, or a suitable power of this polynomial, is the characteristic polynomial of a + bλ + cµ as an element of End 0 A. Then from ω = a + bλ + cµ mod ℓ and by comparing the coefficients of the characteristic polynomials of a + bλ + cµ and ω, we obtain a system of polynomials in a, b, c, from that we can determine a as before.
However, if µλ = λµ, we run into difficulty if we try to mount the same line of attack. In this case Q[λ, µ] as a subalgebra of End 0 A is not commutative and it is not clear whether one can efficiently determine the structure of Q[λ, µ] explicitly. This is why in our trilinear map the F ℓ -dimension of U/ℓU is generated by two elements that do not commute.
Below we give a reduction from the discrete logarithm problem to further clarify how the security of our trilinear map depends on the hardness of constructing an explicit description of the subalgebra generated by two non-commuting elements.
From the random samples of elements in M pick two, λ and µ, then it is likely that they generate M/ℓM . Therefore the discrete logarithm problem can be described as follows: given ω ∈ M 1 , to find a such that ω = a + bλ + cµ mod ℓ where b, c ∈ Z.
Suppose we are given a Q-basis of Q[λ, µ] with λ and µ expressed in the basis, as well as the multiplication table on the basis. We want to determine a, b, c such that ω = a + bλ + cµ mod ℓ. As before we can express the action of a+ bλ+ cµ on the basis with the help of the multiplication table and from that determine the characteristic polynomial F of a + bλ + cµ acting on K, with coefficients being polynomials in a, b, c. Let ρ denote the irreducible polynomial of a + bλ + cµ. Let f denote the characteristic polynomial of a + bλ + cµ as an element of End 0 A.
Let d h denote the degree of a polynomial h.
We have F = ρH, f = ρh for some polynomials H and h. For each choice of d ρ |2g, we set up a polynomial system as follows. Treat ρ, h and H as unknown polynomials. We have d F −d ρ +2g+3 unknown including a, b, c and the unknown coefficients of ρ, h and H.
Let F ω be the characteristic polynomial of ω, which is of degree 2g. From F ω = f = ρh mod ℓ and F = ρH, by comparing coefficients, we derive 2g + d F many polynomial equations. If
There are at least as many polynomial equations as the number of unknown variables, so we expect on heuristic ground to have finitely many solutions. For each solution we check if ω = a + bλ + cµ mod ℓ by acting on a random point in A[ℓ]. Lemma 3.1. The restriction of the map ι to E ∩ C(A) is efficiently computable; that is, given λ ∈ C(A), ι(λ) can be computed in time polynomial in ||λ|| and ||f || and ||π||, where f is the characteristic polynomial of λ.
Proof Suppose λ ∈ C(A). Then ι(λ) is a root of the characteristic polynomial f of λ. By Lemma 2.3 f can be constructed in time polynomial in ||λ|| and ||f ||. By factoring f over Q(π), we can express each root of f in Q(π) in the form m −1 i a i π i where m and a i are integers. This takes time polynomial in ||f || and ||π||. We want to check if λ = m −1 i a i π i A . If the equality does not hold then mλ = i a i π i A mod ℓ ′ with high probability for random prime ℓ ′ not dividing m deg λ. Therefore choose a small random ℓ ′ not dividing deg λ and m, and check that the equality holds mod ℓ ′ by acting on A[ℓ ′ ], as in Lemma 2.3. Then the correct root of the characteristic polynomial of λ can be determined as the image under ι.
Given polynomially many elements λ in M , we can by Lemma 3.1 efficiently compute their images under ι and determine ι(M ) as a subspace of Q(π).
Given λ ∈ M 1 , we want to determine a ∈ Z such that λ − a mod ℓ ∈ M/ℓM . This reduces to finding a such that ι(λ) − a mod ℓ ∈ ι(M ), which can be solved efficiently since linear algebra in Q(π) is easy once elements are expressed in terms of the basis π i , i = 0, ..., e − 2 where
If A is simple and ordinary then C(A) = End 0 (A). This is why we do not consider ordinary abelian varieties.
3.5. The case when M 1 ⊂ C(A). In this case the discrete logarithm appears to be difficult generally speaking. However suppose we are given a submodule M ′ of End 0 A containing M 1 together with an effective basis µ 1 , ..., µ n of M ′ as a Z-module. Then the discrete logarithm problem on M 1 /M ⊗ Z/ℓZ can be solved efficiently, as we show below.
Since the basis for M ′ is effective, for each µ i in the basis and prime ℓ ′ , the action of µ i on A[ℓ ′ ] can be explicitly determined in time (ℓ ′ ) O(g) . Moreover for every λ = i a i λ i ∈ M ′ with a i ∈ Z, |a i | is polynomially bounded in deg λ for all i.
Let λ ∈ M 1 . We can find a i ∈ Z such that λ = n i=1 a i µ i as follows. For a small prime ℓ ′ , find b i < ℓ ′ such that λ and i b i µ i act the same on A[ℓ ′ ]. By Lemma 2.2 and the assumption on M ′ we know that this can be done in (ℓ ′ ) O(g) time.
Then a i = b i mod ℓ ′ for all i. By the assumption on the basis of M ′ , we only need to consider all primes ℓ ′ up to a bound polynomial in log(deg λ) in order to determine a i for all i by Chinese Remaindering.
We have polynomially many λ i ∈ M and a λ ∈ M 1 , and we would like to find a ∈ Z such that λ − a mod ℓ ∈ M 1 /M ⊗ Z/ℓZ.
We can determine the decomposition of all λ i , for all i, λ, and 1 (as an endomorphism) in terms of the basis for M ′ as above, and suppose u i , and v and v 0 are respectively the coefficient vectors in their decomposition. Suppose u i mod ℓ generate M/ℓM as a vector space over F ℓ , which is most likely the case. Then v = x 0 v 0 + n i=1 x i u i mod ℓ for some x i ∈ Z/ℓZ for i = 0, . . . , n. Solve the linear system over F ℓ to obtain a solution x i , i = 0, . . . , n, and x 0 is what we want, that is a = x 0 mod ℓ.
3.6. Summary. In constructing the trilinear map we choose A to be a simple but non-ordinary abelian variety with principal polarization. As discussed above, the construction gives rise to a discrete logarithm problem on some U 1 /U ⊗ Z/ℓZ where U/ℓU has a basis of two elements that do not commute, and U 1 /ℓ ′ U 1 = U/ℓ ′ U for primes ℓ ′ = ℓ.
The discrete logarithm problem is reducible to constructing an explicit description of the algebra generated by two non-commuting endomorphisms -a basis over Q, the multiplication table for the basis, and the two elements expressed in the basis. It is also be reducible to constructing an effective Z-basis for the endomorphism ring of a simple non-ordinary abelian variety. Both problems appear to be hard.
For a simple abelian variety A the center of the division algebra End 0 A is a CM field Q(π) where π is a Weil number (unique up to conjugacy) associated with the Frobenius endomorphism of A. Our analysis shows that an endomorphism λ D determined by a divisor can be effectively expressed as an element in Q(π), if λ D is in the center of End 0 A. This is an important reason why the discrete logarithm problem can be attacked when U 1 is contained in the center of End 0 A.
A consequence of Tate's theorem ( [8] , also see Chapter 2 [10] ) is that the local invariants of End 0 A as a division algebra centered at Q(π) is completely determined by π. The question is, apart from the center, how to explicitly and efficiently determine the structure of End 0 A, or in a smaller scale, the subalgebra generated by two non-commuting elements. This is an interesting and important problem for further investigation.
